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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 15023

-vsWILLIAM ROBERTS CHIPMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953), driving or controlling a
vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Salt Lake,
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge, presiding, with a jury,
and found guilty by the jury of driving or being in actual
physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the judgment of the lower court
beSponsored
affirmed.
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was arrested for a violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44

(1953), during the early morning hours of

October 30, 1975.

The facts, as stated in the record, were

presented as follows:
During the early morning hours of October 30, 1975,
Pat Wellbourn was preparing for bed (12:00 or 12:30 a.m.),
when she "heard a motor pull up" outside her residence on
Brooklane Drive in Salt Lake County (T.3,4).

She looked

outside her window and saw a pickup truck (camper

style)

driving back and forth, coming close to striking the fire
hydrant several times (T.5).

This was occurring at an

approximate distance of a little further than thirty to
thirty-five feet from Ms. Wellbourn' s window through which
she was viewing the truck (T.4,5).
The truck eventually came to a stop, and Ms.
Wellbourn attempted to sleep, but was prevented from so
doing because the noise of the engine running was "bugging"
her (T. 6) •

She once again looked through the window, seeing

the globe or dome light on inside the cab of the truck
(T. 6) •

She testified that she saw a person inside the cab

(a man)

(T.6).

This person then turned the dome light off

and then slumped over the steering wheel

(T.7).
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Ms. Wellbourn concluded her testimony by saying
that she became quite concerned that the person in the
truck might have been hurt or sick, so she told Pat
Quinlen when he arrived at her horne (2:00 or 2:30a.m.),
at which time the police were called (T.7,8).
Worley was with Pat Quinlen at that time.

Larry

Both of them

left the house to go outside immediately after calling
the police (T.9).
On cross-examination, Ms.

~vellbourn

testified

that the engine in the truck was running from the time
she just noticed the truck (12:00 or 12:30 a.m.), until
Pat Quinlen and Larry Worley arrived (2:00 or 2:30 a.m.)
(T.lO,ll).

Pat Quinlen testified that he arrived at Pat
Wellbourn's place about 1:00 a.m., at which time he was
informed of the presence of the truck with a man slumped
over the steering wheel (T.l3,14).

He immediately looked

through the window and observed the same truck with a man
slumped over the steering wheel, as had been described
by Pat Wellbourn (T.l4).

The man slumped over the

steering wheel was identified by Quinlen as the appellant
(T.l4).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Further testimony by Quinlen revealed that the
police were notified of this situation, arriving on the
scene approximately ten minutes thereafter (T.l4,15).
Quinlen testified that his observations revealed that ilie
police had a difficult time trying to awaken the appellant,
and he was still slumped over the steering wheel when the
police arrived (T.l6).

The appellant also had to be helped

out of the truck by the police (T.l6,17), was "a little bit
staggery," and presented communication problems to the
police (T.l7).
--

-

----

Upon cross-examination, Quinlen testified to the
fact that the dome light was on in the truck, the engine
was running, and the appellant was slumped over the wheel
when he (Quinlen) first observed the vehicle (T.l9).

His

testimony also revealed that the truck lights were on
(T.20).
Larry Worley arrived with Pat Quinlen at Ms.
Wellbourn's house somewhere between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m.,
at which time he noticed the truck parked with the back whe
on the sidewalk and the front wheels on the street (T.22),
The truck was one of camper style and was parked in front
of Ms. Wellbourn's house (T.22).

A man, identified by

Worley as the appellant, was in the truck sitting in the
driver's seat, slumped over onto his right side (T.23).
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Worley testified that the police had a hard time waking the
appellant up, and had to "bounce him up and down in the
seat."

(T.24).

This process took three to five minutes.

The appellant was not standing too well (once the officers
got him out of the truck), was not in a very good mood,
and was using some "pretty abusive" language, very slurred
and not very comprehensible. (T. 24,25).

Worley testified

that the appellant had an odor of alcohol on his breath
(T.25), and that it was his (Worley's) opinion that the
appellant had been drinking (T.25).

Worley concluded his

testimony on direct examination by saying that the
appellant had to be assisted by the officers to the
police car following his arrest because he (appellant)
"wasn't walking very straight." (T.29).
On redirect examination, Worley said that in
his opinion, the appellant was "pretty well sloshed"
(referring to the state of intoxication)

(T.41).

Upon

recross examination, Worley said he observed a cup on
the dashboard of the truck with alcoholic beverages in it
(T.42), and was able to smell the odor of alcohol on
appellant's breath (T.43).
Officer Shipanboard of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Department arrived at Brooklane Drive sometime
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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after 1:00 a.m. on October 30, 1975.

Upon his arrival he

observed a truck backed up against a fire hydrant with the
lights on and the engine running (T. 46).

There was a man

slumped over the wheel and a cup in the front window of th 1
truck (T.46).

Officer Shipanboard shook the appellant,

trying to awaken him, but got no response (T. 4 7) •

He was

finally able to arouse the appellant after Officer Neff
arrived.

The appellant was a little fiesty (T.49) and

smelled like alcohol (T. 50) •

He did not walk very stable

(T.SO), and once at the patrol car, he swung at the
officers, saying a few unkind remarks (T.Sl).
Officer Shipanboard testified that in his opinion
the appellant had been drinking and was at the time under
the influence of alcohol (T.52).

On cross-examination, Officer Shipanboard testified
that alcohol was in the cup found on the dashboard (T.53),
and that appellant had been drinking it (T.53).

He

reiterated that upon his arrival, he found the truck backed
up against the hydrant, lights on and engine running (T.SSI
He also found the appellant slumped over the wheel (T.56).
Shipanboard stated that he turned the engine off upon his
arrival, but did not shut off the lights.
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The final witness for the prosecution was Officer
Neff of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department.

He

arrived on the scene after Officer Shipanboard observed
a man lying down on the front seat of the truck in the
driver's position with his head towards the passenger
side (T.63).

He noticed an odor of alcohol about the

appellant (T.64).

The lights of the truck (headlights)

were still on, but the engine had been turned off (T.65).
The appellant needed assistance from both officers because
he was unstable on his feet (T.65).

Officer Neff testified

that the appellant was not cooperating in their attempt to
search him, throwing his arms wildly around at the officers
(T. 65).
Subsequent to his being advised of his Miranda
rights, appellant told Officer Neff that he had been
drinking earlier that night (T.67,68).
Officer Neff further testified that he observed
the cup on the dashboard containing a liquid which had
the odor of whiskey to it (T.68), and that it was his
opinion that the appellant was under the influence of
alcohol (T.68,69).
Upon cross-examination, Officer Neff testified
that it took him approximately three to five minut~~o
awaken the appellant (T.70).
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On redirect, Neff said that appellant was very
unstable and unsure of himself on his feet (T.75), and
his coordination was "off."

(T.76).

Finally, it was Officer Neff's opinion that
the appellant was "fumbling around" so much due to his
state of intoxication (T.78).
The only witness called for the defense was
Terry Nish, not an eyewitness to the incident, who
testified as to the difficulty he had had on several
occasions in awakening the appellant (T.88).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLA.l\:IT' S CONVICTION SHOULD BE AFFIR11ED BECAUSE
IT RELIES ON ACTS OCCURRING CONCURRENT AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S ARRIVAL AT
APPELLANT'S VEHICLE.
A.

THE ARRESTING OFFICER MADE A VALID ARREST FOR
THREE MISDEMEANORS COMMITTED BY APPELLANT IN
HIS PRESENCE, TO-\HT: ( 1) BEING IN ACTUAL
PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR IN VIOLATION
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953); (2) BEING
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR,
TO A DEGREE THAT THE PERSON MAY ENDANGER
HIMSELF OR ANOTHER, IN A PUBLIC PLACE, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701 (1973),
AS AMENDED; (3) BEING IN AN INTOXICATED
CONDITION IN A PUBLIC PLACE IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-7-13 (1953), AS AMENDED.
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B.

THE EVIDENCE OF BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL
CONTROL OF A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE M~. § 41-6-44 (1953),
IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.

A.

Before attempting any response to the points

of argument set forth by appellant, it should be noted
that appellant's factual summary and legal arguments have
been presented based upon a seemingly strong assumption by
appellant that the facts are as he alleged them to be.

The

jury apparentry viewed the evidence in a different light,
finding the appellant guilty.

Respondent will address

itself to the facts and legal issues based upon the evidence
which tends to support the verdict.
The Supreme Court of Utah has very clearly stated
that the evidence and any reasonable inferences that fairly
may be drawn therefrom must be surveyed in the light favorable
to the jury's verdict.
P.2d 246 (1970).

State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470

This Court must assume, therefore, that

the jury believed that evidence which supports its verdict
and must review the record in that light.
548 P.2d 619 (Utah 1976).

Lee v. Howes,

See also State v. Dutchover, 85

N.M. 72, 509 P.2d 264 (1973), where on appeal from conviction,
evidence is reviewed in light most favorable to state.
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With this in mind, respondent will address the
issue raised as to whether or not the arrest was valid,
A look into the Utah Code Annotated and applicable case
law reveals that a valid arrest was effected.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3 (1953), as amended, reads
in part as follows:
"A peace officer may make an
arrest • • • without a warrant. .
(1} For a public offense committed
or attempted in his presence • .
It should be noted that the above section does not specify
that the officer must personally witness the offense for
which he is making the arrest without a warrant.

As

the

section reads, an officer could conceivably watch a
suspect as he committed or attempted to commit a public
offense, then arrest him without a warrant and charge him
with a separate offense which he (the officer) had
reasonable cause to believe the suspect had committed.
Such was the case in State v. Bryan, 16 Utah 2d 4 7, 395
P.2d 539

(1964).

In that case the defendant ran into the

rear end of a flat-bed truck, killing some passengers in
the car.

The sheriff arrived on the scene within a minute

or two after the accident.

Upon his arrival, the sheriff

found the defendant sitting on the curb with a strong odor
of alcohol on his breath and apparently in an intoxicated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
condition.
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defendant
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Library Services
and Technology
Act, administered
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Utah State Library.
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The

defendant was taken to a hospital, treated for wounds, and
placed under warrantless arrest for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

41-6-44 (1953).

He was also later charged with automobile

homicide.
The defendant alleged that his arrest for driving
while intoxicated, a misdemeanor, was unlawful because it
was not committed in the presence of the arresting officer.
The court rejected this argument, using the rationale that
"the defendant was intoxicated in a public place in violation
of Sec. 32-7-13,.U.C.A. 1953."

The court concluded its

attention to this issue by succinctly declaring:
"Nor can he [defendant] justifiably
complain because he was arrested for and
finally charged with a different crime than
that which the officer had actually seen
him commit." 395 P.2d at 540.
Other jurisdictions have similarly rejected arguments
such as those propounded by the defendant in State v. Bryan,
supra, holding that warrantless arrests can be made in
"driving or operating under the influence" cases, where the
officer does not actually see the offense committed, but has
reasonable cause to believe that the law has been violated.
City of Oregon v. Szakovits, 32 Ohio St. 2d 271, 291 N.E.2d
742 (1972); State v. Darabcsek, 412 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1967);
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State v. Dickens, 130 N.J. Super. 73, 325 A.2d 353 (1974);

Commonwealth v. Klock, Pa.Super., 327 A.2d 375 (1974). Seo'

.I

also 74 A.L.R. 3d 1138.

In both Dickens and Klock, the

defendant was found by officers in an automobile either on
the highway or the adjoining shoulder with the engine
running, the headlights on, and a strong odor of alcohol
present.

In Klock, the defendant admitted that he had beer.

drinking in a bar earlier and had driven the vehicle.
The court in Klock, at 327 A.2d 384, seeminglyada1
a new "dimension" to reasonable cause by declaring that
police officers could not only use facts obtained through
personal knowledge to make warrantless arrests, but could':
"inferences":
". • • In assessing whether appellant
was operating the car while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, i.e.,
was committing a crime in their presence,
the troopers could rely not only on the
'personal knowledge acquired • • •
through [their] senses' but also on
'inferences properly drawn from the
testimony of their senses."
Although the case law in Utah is seemingly not as
broad as that enunciated in some other jurisdictions,
statutory amendments have broadened the scope of warrantJe;
arrests by peace officers by enabling them to arrest on
reasonable cause for believing a person to have committed
a public offense, although not in the arresting officer's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

presence.

Certain statutory conditions are also attached

to this section of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
Section 77-13-3 (3) (a) (b) (c).
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be seen
that the arrest was valid based on several theories.
First, the theory that the officer (Shipanboard)
observed appellant in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
is sound.

The evidence reveals that Officer Shipanboard

approached the truck in which the appellant was slumped
over the steering wheel, noticed the engine running and
headlights on, saw a cup on the dashboard containing what
appeared to be alcohol, and smelled a strong odor of
alcohol.

This, coupled with the fact that the appellant

was extremely hard to awaken, being in the early hours
of the morning, certainly justified Officer Shipanboard
in arresting appellant for being in actual physical control
of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953),
as amended.

This is of course looking at the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict.

The jury was

also jutified in arriving at such a conclusion, as will
be discussed later.
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The second theory on which the arrest can be justifie:
as valid is that enunciated in State v. Bryan, supra.
Officer Shipanboard witnessed the appellant in violation of
two sections of the Utah Code Annotated, other than Section
41-6-44.

Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-13 (1953), reads:
"No person shall drink liquor
in a public building, park or
stadium or be in an intoxicated
condition in a public place."
(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (1953), as amended, reads

in part as follows:
"(1) A person is guilty of
intoxication if he is under the
influence of intoxicating liquor •
to a degree that the person may endanger
himself or another, in a public place or
in a private place where he unreasonably
disturbs other persons."
Based on the law set forth by this Honorable Court in
State v. Bryan, supra, Officer Shipanboard could have arrest~
appellant for a violation of either or both of the above
sections, without a warrant, and subsequently charged him wid
violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44 (1953).
Which theory is and was used is not the issue.
They are both legally sound in this jurisdiction, and au
both supported by the evidence in the case.

The appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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indulged himself in actions which could certainly lead
Officer Shipanboard to believe that the appellant was
in a highly intoxicated state, e.g., odor of alcohol
on breath, slumped over steering wheel in a "passed
out" condition, slurred speech once awake, unable to
stand on own feet without assistance, etc.

As will

be subsequently discussed, a jury could also reach
this same conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.

Based

upon either theory, the arrest must be upheld as
valid.
B.

THE EVIDENCE OF BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL
CONTROL OF A VEHICLE tvHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44
(1953), IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A
CONVICTION.

-15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant alleges that the evidence did not support
the conviction for seemingly three reasons:

( 1) there was no

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the intoxication
affected the ability of the accused to drive;

(2) no breath-

olyzer test was taken by the accused and there was not conelusive evidence of driving under the influence;

(3) the verdL

was supported only by circumstantial evidence, and there are
several possible explanations which support the constitutiona:

presumption of innocence which are consistent with that evided
It should just be noted in response that questions
such as degree of intoxication, impaired ability to drive,
actual physical control of the vehicle, etc., are questions
to be determined by the jury, unless as a matter of law evider:

1

exists on which reasonable men would not differ.

State v.

Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115 P.2d 911 (1941); State v. Hopkins,
11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486

(1961); State v. Schad, supra;

State v. Englehart, 158 Conn. 117, 256 A.2d 231
v. Brown, Or. App., 485 P.2d 444

(1969); ~

(1971).

As is so often the case in appeals, appellant bases
his argument on evidence which is viewed "through the glasses
of the appellant."

Sometimes these glasses are tinted so as

to expose and reveal only that version of the evidence which
tends to support the appellant's allegations.

-16-

As such, the
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appellant assumes that the jury is obliged to believe his
version of the evidence.

This Court commented on this

erroneous assumption in State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d at 487:
"The difficulty with defendant's
position is that the rule he relies on
is not applicable where, as here, there
is dispute in the evidence and one
version theory does not support his
thesis,
He errs in assuming that the
jury was obliged to believe his story
as to what happened ••. it was their
exclusive prerogative to judge the
credit to be given the evidence and to
determine the facts."
Appellant seems to be guilty in the case at bar of
that very situation as described above in Hopkins.
that the jury

~believed

He assumes

his interpretation of the evidence,

therefore giving credence to his explanation as to why the
appellant was found in the condition he was.

This of course,

is erroneous, and was again commented on by the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Schad,

470 P.2d at 247:

"As to point (1): Whether the evidence
justifies the verdict, we survey the evidence
and any reasonable inferences that fairly
may be drawn therefrom in the light favorable
to the jury's verdict. However, there are
some further observations as to the manner
in which the basic rule is applicable in
this case.
It is true, as the defendant
contends, that where a conviction is based
on circumstantial evidence, the evidence should
be looked upon \vith caution, and that it must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the
guilt of defendant. This is entirely logical,
because if the jury believes that there is a
reasonable hypothesis in the evidence consistent with the defendant's innocence, there
would naturally be a reasonable doubt as to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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his guilt.
Nevertheless, that preposition does not apply to each circumstance separately, but is a matter within
the prerogative of the jury to determine
from all of the facts and circumstances
shown; and if therefrom they are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt, it necessarily follows that they
regarded the evidence as excluding every
other reasonable hypothesis.
Unless upon
our review of the evidence, and the reasonable inferences fairly to be deduced
therefrom, it appears that there is no
reasonable basis for such a conclusion, we
should not overturn the verdict."
Appellant has not really offered his version of t~ [
evidence, but has merely alleged that there are possible
explanations which tend towards the innocence of appellant.
,1\

review of the evidence shows that the jury could very well

have found that the evidence presented, and inferences fairly I
drawn therefrom, excluded every reasonable hypothesis except
the guilt of the appellant.
The evidence shows three witnesses observing a man
slumped over the steering wheel of a truck in the early hours
of the morning.

The headlights of the truck are on and the

engine is running.

One of the witnesses observes the truck

moving forward and backward in continuous motion, striking a
nearby fire hydrant.
arrive.

The police are called and subsequentlY

Officer Shipanboard finds the appellant slumped over

the steering wheel, a strong odor of alcohol on his breath,
and a cup of whisky sitting on the dashboard.
engine running and headlights on.

He too finds the

The officer finds it
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I

extremely hard to awaken the appellant.

Officer Neff then

arrives, and observes the same situation, with the exception
of the engine being shut off.

The appellant is unable to

stand on his feet without assistance, and becomes very fisty
and uncooperative with the officer.

His speech is quite

slurred and he fumbles about incoherently, at times taking
a swing at the officers.

He admits having been drinking earlier

in the evening.
Certainly the above set of facts have to be stretched
to the point of exaggeration to support a theory that the
appellant was "sleeping," and that someone else had driven the
truck there for him.

Eyewitness testimony by Pat Hellbourn

disputes this theory, as the jury could reasonably believe that
she saw the appellant drive the truck to the position in which
it was found by the officers.

Certainly a theory that the

appellant was "passed out" or was "sleeping it off" is plausible
and could have been so believed by the jury, as well as appellant's contention that the appellant "happened to sleeping" at
that time of the morning.

They jury could have found that the

action of appellant in leaning over the steering wheel with
the motor running and the headlights on constituted "actual
physical control" as specified in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44,
(1953) as amended.
Nevertheless, an inescapable conclusion is apparent:
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that the evidence presented, and the inferences to be

fa~~

draHn therefrom, was sufficient to support the verdict.
Appellant questions the validity of the circumstantial evidence, and seems to allege that no conviction can
stand because there was no chemical or breatholyzer tests
administered.

Officer Neff testified that no field

sobr~~

tests were administered because of the fact that it Has the
opinion of the officers that the appellant was in no condition
to perform any of these tests

(T.75).

Even so, Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44

~1953)

does not

require that any tests be administered, but may be used to
establish certain presumptions.

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (b) (4)

(1953) states:
"The foregoing provisions of this
subdivision shall not be construed as J
limiting the introduction of any other
competent evidence bearing upon the
question whether or not the person was
under the influence of alcohol."
The officers were not required by law to administer any of
the tests enumerated in §41-6-44.
be affected by this fact alone.

Thus, the verdict should no:
See People v. Culp, 537

P.M

746 (Colo. 1975), where the court said that chemical tests are
neither necessary nor required to prove intoxication.
As to the question of circumstantial evidence, it is
a well settled principle of law that no distinction between
circumstantial evidence and direct evidence is recognized as
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far as probative force is concerned.
supra.

State v. Englehart,

At 256 A.2d 232, the Court in Englehart said:
" ... if evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, should convince a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused
is guilty, that is all that is required
for conviction."

This

s~ue

principle holds true in Utah, as recently expressed

in State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976).
Turning now to the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain a finding by the jury that the appellant
was in actual physical control of the vehicle and also under
the influence of intoxicating liquors, it must again be noted
that these are questions for the jury to determine.

There are

however, many cases, some with nearly identical factual
situations such as the one at hand, which have dealt

with these

issues.
Perhaps the best place to begin is with our own
jurisdiction.

The most notable case, also cited by appellant,

is that of State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 4C4, 483 P.2d 442 (1971).
There, the defendant was convicted of being in actual physical
control of his vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.

He was found asleep in his car with the smell of alcohol

about him.

His car was completely off the traveled portion of

the highway and the motor was not running.
reversed on appeal.

His conviction was

The Court seemed to strongly imply that

the difference between the Bugger case and similiar cases of
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other jurisdictions was the fact that the car was not on
traveled portion of the highway, the engine was not
etc.

t~

runni~,

The issue of whether or not one is found behind the

steering wheel or in the car with the motor running seems to

be of significance in determining \vhether or not there is act .

11

physical control, not only in Utah but in other jurisdictions,
Jenkins v. State, Okl. Cr., 501 P.2d 905 (1972), where defen·
dant was found in an automobile, which was in a ditch with the
lights on and motor running, and was convicted; State v. ~/ebb,
78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338

(1954), where defendant was held to

I
I

be in actual physical control when he was found "passed out"
sitting behind the steering wheel with the motor running;

Jacobsen v. State, 551 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1976), where defendant I

was found sleeping in the front seat, just under the steering I
wheel, and motor running.

See also 47 A.L.R. 2d 571 for other I

cases.
The term "actual physical control" has been d•ofined
by this Court in State v. Bugger, 483 P.2d at 443:
"The word 'actual' has been defined
as meaning 'existing in act or reality;
••• in action or existence at the time
being; present; ••. '
The word 'physical'
is defined as 'to exercise restraining
or directing influence over; to dominate;
regulate; hence, to hold from actions; to
curb.' The term in 'actual physical
control' in its ordinary sense means
'existing' or 'present bodily restraint,
directing influence, domination or
regulation.'"
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Many of these terms and expressions were used in State v.
~~

133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 (1952); Parker v. State,

Okl. Cr., 424 P.2d 997 (1967) and Hughes v. State, Okl. Cr.
535 P.2d 1023 (1975), in defining "actual physical control."
It should be noted that the Court in Parker adopted the
definition set forth in Ruona, and the Utah Supreme Court in
Bugger quoted from Ruona in defining "actual physical control."
In Ruona, the defendant was found in his parked automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, with the motor
still running.
Was there evidence to adequately find that the appel·lant
in the case at -bar \vas ir. actual physical control of his
vehicle?

Based upon the overwhelming majority of case law,

the answer is yes.

The appellant, while behind the steering

wheel, with the motor running, was in a position in which he
could exercise total management and authority over the movement of the vehicle.

He could make the automobile move by

merely shifting the gear.

As was pointed out in Ruona, control

means more than the ability to stop an automobile, it means
the ability to keep it from moving or starting, and to exercise
directing influence over.

The jury could reasonably find that

the appellant did in fact exercise "actual physical control"
over the truck in the case at bar.
Finally, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the jury finding that the appellant was
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under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
is a question of jury determination.
Idaho 868, 522 P.2d 531

(1974).

Here again, this

Lombard v. Cory, 95

There are however, cases whkt

have established certain definitions and guidelines.
Different jurisdictions seem to have different word·
ings or phrases defining the term "under the influence of
intoxicating liquor", yet they all basically say the same thinJI
1

i.e., keep the person who is under the influence of alcohol ofi 1
the public highways in the capacity as a driver.

Most jurisdic·f

tions have held that no specific degree of intoxication is

(

required, only that the driver at the time he was charged had

I

consumed intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to influence

I

or affect his driving of a motor vehicle.
401 P.2d 824
P.2d 977

State v. r1cFarland,

I

(Idaho 1965); State v. Warner, 97 Idaho 204, 541

(1975).

Colorado has adopted as its test for the

level of intoxication one of "substantial

>
.
.
.
( 1ntox1cat1on

I

so as

to render the defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle
Thompson v. People, 510 P.2d 311 (Colo. 1973).

Oklahoma has

consistently held that a person is "operating a motor vehicle

1

while under the influence of intoxicating liquor·• if n1s ne~vo
.

-

-

\

system, brain or muscles are impaired to any appreciable degree
so that he cannot operate his automobile as would an ordinary,!
.s
prudent and cautious man, in full possession of his facultl6,'
using reasonable care, under tight conditions.

Leullen ~
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~,

64 Okl. Cr. 382, 81 P.2d 323 (1938); Application of

Baggett, 531

P~2d

lOll (Okl. 1974); Appeal of Tucker, Okla.

App. 538 P.2d 626 (1975).

The New Mexico Supreme Court, in

State v. Myers, 88 N.M. 16, 536 P.2d 280 (1975) held that
"under the influence" meant a person who is to the slightest
degree less able, either mentally or physically, or both, to
exercise clear judgement and steady hand necessary to handle
an automobile with safety to himself and the public.

Finally,

the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Robinson, 385 P.2d 754
(Oregon 1963), had adopted the test of whether one has imbibed
to the extent that his mental and physical condition is
deleteriously affected.

See also 142 A.L.R., 550, 555.

Perhaps the best summation of all the definitions
was expressed in Grooms v. State, 142 P.2d 862 (Okl. 1943),
where the court, at 864 said:
" ••• It is not a question of how
much intoxicating liquor a person accused
of operating his car while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor has drunk,
but rather a question of whether or not he
has imbibed enough alcoholic drink to affect
his faculties to such an extent that the
jury, under all the facts in the case,
could reasonably conclude that he was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor."
It matters not which definition is applied, the fact
remains that the appellant's condition could very comfortably
fit into any of the tests adopted.

The jury could easily find
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that appellant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
at the time he was discovered by Officer Shipanboard, not
only because of the condition he

(appellant) was in at that

time, but also because of his actions upon and after being
awakened.

,

The jury could also draw reasonable inferences from I

the presence of the cup containing the alcohol on the dashboarcl
The evidence as presented, and the inference to be
fairly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict.
POINT II
THE CONVICTIOc\1 IN '::'HE LOWER COURT MUST BE
AFFIRMED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE
JURY MAY HAVE BASED ITS FINDING ON THE CONDUCT
OF THE APPELLANT INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE ON HIS
CONDITION AFTER THE POLICE OFFICERS ARRIVED.
A.

APPELL.Z\.NT HAD ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL
OF THE VEHICLE WHEN THE OFFICERS ARRIVED.

B.

THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPELLANT WAS
CONVICTED IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS AS
APPLIED TO APPELh~NT, NOR IS IT CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

C.

APPELLANT'S "SLEEPING" CONDITION IS A
FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY,
I.E., ~'lAS THE APPELLANT TRULY SLEEPING
IN THE USUAL CONNOTATION OF THE WORD,
OR WAS HE "PASSED OUT" DUE TO INTOXICATION.

A.

APPELLANT HAD ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL
OF THE VEHICLE WHEH THE OFFICERS ARRIVED.

Appellant contends that he did not drive or have
actual physical control of the vehicle subsequent to the

-26-
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the arrival of the officers.

This issue was thoroughly

reviewed in section B under Point I of this brief.
as a

su~ation

However,

of that discussion, it can be said that

whether or not the appellant had actual physical control of
the vehicle at the time of the arrival of the officer or
subsequent thereto is a matter wholly within the prerogative
of the jury, to be decided based upon the evidence presented
and any inferences derived therefrom.

This issue was apparently

decided by the jury contra to appellant's point of vie\'{.
B.

THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPELLANT WAS
CONVICTED IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS
AS APPLIED TO APPELLANT, NOR IS IT CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

Appellant now alleges that Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44
(1953) is vague as applied to him, since all reasonable men
would have to guess that its meaning included a sleeping person.
It should first of all be noted that statutes very
similiar to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953) as amended have
been upheld in most jurisdictions as not being vague or uncertain,
therefore, constitutional.

State v. Ruona,

supra~

Thompson v.

People, supra.
The standard as to statutory certainty in Utah is
expressed in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146
(1969):
".- •• The well-established rule
is that a statute creating a crime
should be sufficiently certain that
persons of ordinary intelligence who

l
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desire to obey the law may know how
to conduct themselves in conformity
with it. A fair and logical concomitant of that rule is that such
a penal statute should be similarly
clear, specific and understandable
as to the penalty imposed for its
violation." 453 P.2d at 148.
With this in mind, one must look now to the intent of the
legislative in enacting §41-6-44, and then to the specific
language used.
In enacting Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44

(1953), it

seems very clear that the legislative intended to define

a~

enact two separate offenses; one being: "it is unlawful. .. for
any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor
to drive ... any vehicle within the state;" and the other being:
"it is unlawful ... for any person who is under the influence of
intoxicating liquor ... to be in actual physical control of
vehicle within the state."

("under the influence of

a~

intox~~

ing liquor" was later changed to "under the influence of alcono:
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, in ~
v. State, supra., at p.lOOO, held that the legislatllre, in

.I

::·::::gC:::i:n:~u::1::~::n:1:::~:t::t::::: :: :::::: ::''"' I
offenses.

Respondent contends that the Utah legislature had

the same thought process in mind when enacting Utah Code Ann.
§41-6-44

(1953).

-28-
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The purpose in wording Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44
(1953) to include both those who drive under the influence
and those who are in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence is two fold:

(1) in the case of

one driving under the influence, to get off the highways
those people whose judgment, vision, reflexes and ability to
see and react have been impaired by drink, State v. Montieth,
417 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Oregon 1966);

(2) in the case of one who

is in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence, to enable the police to apprehend the drunken
driver before he strikes, Hughes v. State, supra.
In summary then, the Utah legislature intended to
make it a crime for one to be under the influence of alcohol
while in actual physical control of a vehicle.

In ascertain-

ing whether one is in "actual physical control" or not, the
general rule that "words of a statute are to be interpreted
in their ordinary, everyday sense, unless a contrary interpretation is indicated in the statute" should be applied.
v. Ruona, 321 P.2d at 618.

State

Using State v. Bugger, supra, as a

guideline, one must use powers beyond human comprehension to
find vagueness or ambiguity in the phrase "actual physical
control" as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953).

See
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Utah Code Ann. §76-1-106
~,

(1973) as amended and Luethen v.

supra., for rules of construction of drunk driving

statute (to be given literal construction so as to bring
safety to those who drive the public highways).
Appellant argues that no union or joint

operat~n

of act and intent exist as required by Utah Code Ann. §76-l-lj
(1953}.

Utah Code Ann. §76-l-21 (1953) specifies that intent

is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense
and sound mind and discretion of the accused.

Utah Code AM.

§76-1-22 (1953) states to the effect that intoxication is
relating to act and intent.

A jury could find that appellant

had the necessary intent to have actual physical control of thi
vehicle by being in the vehicle in an intoxicated condition,
behind the steering wheel, with the engine running.

If the

jury believed the testimony of Pat Wellbourn, they could find

I

that the appellant had the intent to operate or drive the vehicl
by looking at the very act of driving by the appellant.

I

As for the act itself, sufficient evidence existed 1
whereby the jury could find that the appellant did drive or
actually control physically the vehicle in which he was found.
In conclusion, no evidence or argument has been
presented to show that Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953) wasor
is void for vagueness as applied to appellant.

Sufficient

evidence does exist by which the jury could find the necessarj
elements of the offense charged on which to convict.
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C.

APPELLANT'S "SLEEPING" CONDITION IS
A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY,
I.E., WAS THE APPELLANT TRULY SLEEPING
IN THE USUAL CONNOTATION OF THE WORD,
OR lvAS HE "PASSED OUT" DUE TO
INTOXICATION.

Appellant alleges that it appears that the legislature
has made sleeping a crime, and that under Utah Code Ann.
§41-6-44

(1953), all reasonable men would have to guess that

its meaning included a person sleeping.

Appellant seems,

however, to ignm:e the key question to the word "sleeping,"
that being, "Why was the appellant sleeping?"

Was he, as

the old saying goes, "Takine a snooze" or was he so drunk
from imbibing in alcohol that he eventually "passed out" and
had to "sleep it off."
As mentioned before, these are questions for the jury
to determine from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
issue, and as pointed out in earlier discussion, the evidence
and reasonable inference was presented by which the jury could
adequately decide this issue.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has alleged several points of error, which
respondent feels have no legal merit.
judical error has been made.

All presumptions form the

validity of the jury verdict below.
~.,

No showing of pre-

Simpson v. General Motors

24 utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970).

The parties have

had a fair opportunity to present their evidence and have the
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issues determined by a jury, and as this Court said in 1
~
Howes, 548 P.2d at 621:
" ... when that has been accomplished
we will not disturb the determination
made by the jury and the trial court
unless it is shown that there was substantial and prejudicial error which
prevented a fair trial, or that there
is no substantial basis in the evidence
which reasonable minds could conclude
as the jury did ... "
CONCLUSION
For the reasons heretofore stated, the conviction
should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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